Sorry Iceman. I misread some of your posts, and was frustrated.
Yes, given what gmal typed, he could have had a prior probability of 0 that he won in a theoretical model, and thus knowing that any given one matches would not increase the probability that he won.
In practice, no, you cannot actually have a prior probability of 0 that you won a lottery. You can have a really small one, but 0s don't happen[1].
You also just quoted someone else and acted as if I said something.
No, I was speaking to two people in a post. And gave an example of what I was talking about. The quote in question wasn't from you, but it wasn't attributed to you as far as I can tell. You wheren't even the nearest person who was named prior to the quote.
Iceman wrote:Yakk wrote:Iceman, why do you think you know enough about probability to justify strong opinions on the matter?
Like real world qualifications you mean?
Naw. I'm just wondering why you think you know enough about probability to justify strong opinions on the matter. And you seem to have strong opinions on the matter.
Something times 0 is 0.
True. But probability is rarely zero. Physics doesn't have many zeros.
I suppose you could be a strict frequentest and state that P(X) is always 0 or 1 for any concrete statement about the universe X. If it isn't 0 or 1, it is because you where insufficiently specific about your X.
That would be an example of a philosophical objection. In that case, you'd be arguing semantics, stating that Bayesian probability is an invalid use of the term "probability": if you are doing that, you should be explicit that your disagreement is semantic.
I'm wondering if that is what is going on?
An undefined number times anything is undefined.
An unknown positive number, times another number that is greater than 1, is greater than its previous value. Even if we didn't know what it was before, and we don't know what it is afterwards.
If P(Aliens) > 0 (and our current model of physics says this is true[1]), then P(Aliens|We found planets in the goldlocks zone) = P(We found planets in the goldlocks zone|Aliens) * P(Aliens)/P(we found planets in the goldilocks zone).
And if P(We found planets in the goldlocks zone|Aliens) / P(we found planets in the goldilocks zone) > 1, then finding planets in the goldilocks zone increases the probability there are aliens out there.
Which seems like a reasonable definition for "evidence".
And no, I did not learn probability from Wikipedia.

You also just quoted someone else and acted as if I said something.
No. I spoke about two people. Then quoted the second one I spoke about.
I was frustrated, and impolite. I apologize.
[1][spoiler]So if there is a non-zero probability that a given macroscopic prediction of QM is true, and QM gives a non-zero probability of something happening, then a reasonable prior probability of that being true is greater than zero. The resulting probability will be vanishingly small: but all that is required for x*y > x where y > 1 is that x is not identically zero. Any lower bound on x is sufficient, even ridiculous ones.[/quote]