PeteP wrote:That it would encourage a silly argument (as if there weren't already many of that) is not in itself an argument I kinda doubt CU will find that convincing since he doesn't accept 1.1 . Also, there are already theists who argue that without God everyone would be evil.
The point isn't that (2) would give rise to a silly argument. The point is that the truth of (2) would make the argument not silly
. For the reason that the argument is silly just is the obvious falsehood of (2). If we suppose that (2) is correct, the only way the argument could be silly is if it were obviously invalid or if (1) were silly. But the argument is valid, and (1) isn't silly: it's common sense. So if the argument is
silly, we shouldn't want to flock to (2) as an obvious truth, in need of no justification, as CU keeps insisting.
CorruptUser wrote:Most religions' moral systems are a subset of Moral Absolutism. And since they all contradict each other, the vast majority of religions must be wrong. If one was the 'true' religion, evidence for that being correct would be identical religions popping up independently. This has not happened, so there is no substantial evidence that any particular religion is correct.
This is invalid. First, from the fact that E would be evidence for P it does not follow that the absence of E would be evidence against P. For example, seeing Barack Obama in person would provide good evidence that Barack Obama is alive. However, the fact that I have not seen Obama in person is not evidence that Obama is not alive.
Second, in the specific case of convergence of knowledge, it's not true that people have to generally or independently come to a conclusion in order for that conclusion to be true, or in order for it to be a justified belief for some. There are many facts, including some obvious facts, that many people nevertheless disagree about: the fact that God doesn't exist, or the fact that there is no such thing as ESP, or the fact that Lee Harvey Oswald assassinated JFK.
Third, this sort of skeptical argument suffers from its need for specifying which kinds of beliefs count as the same for purposes of seeing whether views have converged. For example, you say that people have not converged on religious beliefs because they have not independently come up with the same religious views, but you probably draw the boundaries of "religion" pretty broadly, including a lot of details like the number and roles of the different gods, the appropriate rituals, and so on. If, on the other hand, you just asked about belief in at least one deity, or belief in some sort of supernatural power, you would find many, many cases of independent, converging beliefs. Conversely, if you clump atheism as one belief, you will find atheism popping up independently in a lot of places. But if, on the other hand, you clump atheism with a whole bunch of moral beliefs and maybe some scientific beliefs as well, you won't find very much independent convergence. Perhaps you could get around this if you had some way of deciding what to split and what to lump, and good reason for thinking that this way of splitting and lumping is a good way to find the truth, but something tells me that you don't.
The point, of course, isn't that belief in God or in any religion is supported by the evidence, but rather that we have to examine the evidence more directly, instead of asking vague questions about which sort of beliefs have converged.
Finally, it's not obvious to me that the beliefs for which we have the best evidence arose independently. Taking the theory of relativity, for example, that view arose in a particular scientific community and got its support from evidence gathered by that community. To my knowledge, nobody without access to Western science worked out the theory of relativity on her own, and nobody thinks that shows that the theory of relativity is just something our society constructed.
CorruptUser wrote:The way a moral system is built via philosophy is by declaring your axioms and goals as a society, and determining what actions lead to that goal.
I would like to call attention to two things here:
- This is false.
- This is an empirical claim, and it can be confirmed or disconfirmed by looking at the contents of the actual work of philosophers. This is no longer your wild pet theories about what counts as evidence for morality: this is something you can check by going out and looking at the observable world. And yet, even for a straightforward claim like this, you haven't tried to provide any sort of evidence or source for it. Why not? Do you have any basis for this claim at all?