you're supposed to vote for your preferred candidate.ManaUser wrote:guenther wrote:Why do you think this? In terms of understanding, I think just the opposite. For ranged voting (assuming something more complicated than approval), just make sure you have a number in range next to each candidate (blank would mean zero). Ranked voting has more restrictions: rank the candidates, no duplicate numbers, etc. Ranked voting seems harder by definition. Perhaps you mean in terms of explaining the concept rather than the actual process, but I don't see why range would be any harder there. In fact, my perceived complexity of ranked voting is what drew me to range voting.
Yes, that's more what I meant. I think the concept would be alien and confusing to alot of people. I can just imagine thousands of little old ladies (sorry to stereotype but...) going "What? I have to rate them now? How do I know what to put?" Whereas the concept of ranking seems fairly easy to grasp.guenther wrote:In terms of "gaming", I'd like to understand how it is done. I tried to follow the link to the paper on ruining approval elections, but all I got was the abstract. I'm fully open to the possibility that range voting has some serious flaws if people aren't voting honestly, but I'd like to see examples so I can understand it.
I didn't read the paper so I can't comment on that, but what I'm talking about is simple enough. Let me use a real example of what I mean. Bush/Gore/Nader (I'll just ignore the other minor parties).
Republicans would approve Bush only.
Democrats would approve Gore, and possibly Nader.
Greens would approve Nader, and probably Gore even if they only see him as the lesser of two evils.
So far so good, the spoiler effect is eliminated. But if Nader had had a realistic chance of winning this would change. Democrats would no longer give him an "approve" (even if they really did approve), fearing they would be helping him beat their preferred candidate.
How is plurality or IRV better at eliminating this problem? At least under range/approval, you can vote for both.Likewise, Greens would be disinclined to approve Gore. So it looks to me like there's still a barrier to minor parties ever becoming "major".
because it reflects how they feel.guenther wrote:Actually if everyone either votes "high" or "low" it will just reduce to approval voting, not plurality.
Right. It's the other part (explained above) that makes it "almost the same" as plurality voting. I admit it's still somewhat better, though.guenther wrote:In my head I imagine people will vote their favorite candidate (e.g. the Ronpaul) at max and perhaps a palpable but more popular candidate (e.g. John McCain) at max-1. And then vote everyone else a 0.
Okay, then. Why would they do that?
It requires less rules to make range than ranked.guenther wrote:This is what sold me off of IRV. As I mentioned, there's more ways to spoil a ballot.
Well this is a whole 'nother can of worms, but it occurs to me that ranked voting would be a good match for a touch-screen "ballot".
Just make it a set of mini-elections:
1. Kerry5, Kerry4, Kerry3, Kerry2 Or Kerry1?
2. Bush5, ...
Or removed the over-vote rule (that voting for >1 = rejected ballot)
How would you change the programming to do ranked?
Why not just use range, and not make it u:ber complicated like that?
Another possible solution would be to change the rules slightly so ranking two candidates the same is not incorrect. I haven't fully thought this through, but perhaps there could be kind of a hybred IRV/Approval system. Suppose I voted like so:
1. Ron Paul (Get out of my keyboard, Randall.)
2. Barack Obama
2. Ralph Nader
3. John McCain
That would mean that as long as Paul is in the running, I approve him. If he's eliminated, I approve Obama and Nader. If one of them is eliminated, I approve the other. If they're both eliminated approve McCain.
Double posts are bad. Quoting back the entirely of a long post and is convenient available in it's full form here in the thread is bad. Fix it.