People choose emotions over reason, no one is surprised

[quantumcat42]

I'm arguing that in your well meaning crusade to define away all intellectual grey areas, you're letting your love of the idea of logic get in the way of its proper application.

Since when have I been trying to define away intellectual gray areas? I've said several times that there are certain things that need to be taken as axiomatic and certain things that can only be known to within degrees of certainty. That doesn't change my point that we should use logic and observation to determine truth because it consistently and by definition results in the most accurate conclusions possible, whereas emotional appeals do not.

You gotta explain that to my girlfriend

In broad principle, I'm not disagreeing with you that a logical approach to a given set of information tends to lead to better results -- but I don't define "better" in terms of "logical", as that renders the term meaningless in this context. Instead, take "better" to describe results more in keeping with reality. Given that definition, saying that a logical approach tends to produce "better" results actually means something. Circular definitions are not useful. You can define "better" as "in keeping with the Word of God" just as easily as "in keeping with logical analysis", in which case a strictly Biblical approach (perhaps in combination with fasting, meditation, and a sacrificial goat) to all problems will, by definition, produce "better" results. But are those results more in keeping with reality?

The leap one must take to trust logical analysis over emotional impulse is not a bad thing at all -- but it is not logical.

[sourmìlk]

You gotta explain that to my girlfriend

*cricket chirp*
*chirp*

In broad principle, I'm not disagreeing with you that a logical approach to a given set of information tends to lead to better results -- but I don't define "better" in terms of "logical", as that renders the term meaningless in this context. Instead, take "better" to describe results more in keeping with reality. Given that definition, saying that a logical approach tends to produce "better" results actually means something. Circular definitions are not useful. You can define "better" as "in keeping with the Word of God" just as easily as "in keeping with logical analysis", in which case a strictly Biblical approach (perhaps in combination with fasting, meditation, and a sacrificial goat) to all problems will, by definition, produce "better" results. But are those results more in keeping with reality?

The leap one must take to trust logical analysis over emotional impulse is not a bad thing at all -- but it is not logical.

Trusting logic is, by definition, logical. I see what you mean though. But yeah, all I want is to express that, whereas logic leads to the best possible conclusions (even if you define "best" as "keeping with reality"), emotional appeals do not. Thus we should rely on logic to determine truth, rather than emotional appeals.

[Shivahn]

I'm not explicitly disagreeing (at least, not in that section) because I'm stating brute fact. Logic is what logicians do - and it's a very, very basic tenet of formal logic that it's truth-preserving rather than truth-generating. Disagreeing with that is deciding that your definition of logic is the correct one, despite what every scholar of logic agrees upon as the definition.

The reason many people are disagreeing with your characterization of logic necessarily leading to the best conclusions is because they're using the standard, formal definition of logic: the study of the validity of reasoning. You seem to be basically defining logic as "sound reasoning." Note that in the standard definition, what people are interested in is whether a particular argument is valid. In layman's terms, they are looking to see if any given argument (this is why I think symbols are a useful tool) will have a true conclusion if fed true premises. In your definition, which I of course could be wrong about, due to my lack of psychic powers, you're interested in whether a particular argument is sound. Which is to say, you're interested in if an argument is valid and the conclusions are true.

So, look at this:

When I say that logic necessarily leads to the best possible conclusions, that is a tautology, because we defined the goodness of conclusions via how well they stand up to logic.

I read that very differently than you wrote it. I see hidden assertions that aren't there when those trained as logicians discuss logic. Namely, you've already assumed that the logic is being used on true premises: if it isn't then it doesn't lead to the best possible conclusion. You also implicitly assume that everyone's using the same premises - if logic necessarily leads to the best possible conclusions, then it is always true that logic leads to the best possible conclusions. If two people disagree on a premise, they can come to different conclusions. If two people can come to different conclusions, then it is not true that there for all best conclusions, logic necessarily leads to them.

As a bit of a side note, defining things however you want doesn't actually make things tautological (or convincing, but that one's more obvious). To be tautological, it would need to be provable using the empty set as premises.

So, to summarize briefly: Logical reasoning will always lead to true conclusions if the argument form is valid and the premises are true. When anyone actually trained in logic talks about logic, they're talking about the argument form being valid. You appear to be tacking on the requirement of true premises, and this is the root of (most of) the disagreement.

[sourmìlk]

I'm not explicitly disagreeing (at least, not in that section) because I'm stating brute fact. Logic is what logicians do - and it's a very, very basic tenet of formal logic that it's truth-preserving rather than truth-generating. Disagreeing with that is deciding that your definition of logic is the correct one, despite what every scholar of logic agrees upon as the definition.

The reason many people are disagreeing with your characterization of logic necessarily leading to the best conclusions is because they're using the standard, formal definition of logic: the study of the validity of reasoning. You seem to be basically defining logic as "sound reasoning." Note that in the standard definition, what people are interested in is whether a particular argument is valid. In layman's terms, they are looking to see if any given argument (this is why I think symbols are a useful tool) will have a true conclusion if fed true premises. In your definition, which I of course could be wrong about, due to my lack of psychic powers, you're interested in whether a particular argument is sound. Which is to say, you're interested in if an argument is valid and the conclusions are true.

Yeah, I included a thing about true premises a bunch of times in this thread. I recognize that true conclusions require valid logic and true premises.

I read that very differently than you wrote it. I see hidden assertions that aren't there when those trained as logicians discuss logic. Namely, you've already assumed that the logic is being used on true premises: if it isn't then it doesn't lead to the best possible conclusion.

I've explicitly stated it needed to be based on true premises several times in this thread.

You also implicitly assume that everyone's using the same premises - if logic necessarily leads to the best possible conclusions, then it is always true that logic leads to the best possible conclusions. If two people disagree on a premise, they can come to different conclusions. If two people can come to different conclusions, then it is not true that there for all best conclusions, logic necessarily leads to them.

We can determine the truth values of premises. The only premises we need to agree on are the base axioms of logic. From there, observation and logic lead us to convergent conclusions. That's the whole point of science, that it's convergent upon a single, correct point of view.

As a bit of a side note, defining things however you want doesn't actually make things tautological (or convincing, but that one's more obvious). To be tautological, it would need to be provable using the empty set as premises.

So, to summarize briefly: Logical reasoning will always lead to true conclusions if the argument form is valid and the premises are true. When anyone actually trained in logic talks about logic, they're talking about the argument form being valid. You appear to be tacking on the requirement of true premises, and this is the root of (most of) the disagreement.

But I've already said that I necessitated true premises.

Would everybody be satisfied with the following? :

As logical analysis of true premises (and the verification of the truth of those premises) necessarily leads to the best possible conclusions, it is not ideal that humans respond more to emotional appeals, which do not necessarily lead to proper conclusions.

[quantumcat42]

Trusting logic is, by definition, logical. I see what you mean though. But yeah, all I want is to express that, whereas logic leads to the best possible conclusions (even if you define "best" as "keeping with reality"), emotional appeals do not. Thus we should rely on logic to determine truth, rather than emotional appeals.

Again, that "by definition" is not useful in determining truth. Jill may logically conclude that logic should be trusted while Bob feels that his emotions are trustworthy and Leslie has faith that faith is the best guide. Maybe Jimbo tosses some rocks on the ground, and reads in the rock's arrangement that they are a trustworthy guide to life. Reality is the standard of measure for truth, and logic is only useful insofar as it leads to that truth. A blind devotion to logic as its own standard is a sure way to throw reasonable error-checking out the window if you're convinced the conclusion you've reached is correct, just because you followed proper procedure to get there. It's a fantastic tool, but it is just a tool. In the OP's (and my girlfriend's) case, emotional appeal can be more a more functional tool of persuasion than detached reasoning; if it gets people closer to reality, more power to it.

As logical analysis of true premises (and the verification of the truth of those premises) necessarily leads to the best possible conclusions, it is not ideal that humans respond more to emotional appeals, which do not necessarily lead to proper conclusions.

As the initial statement is infinitely recursive, going right for the emotional appeal has a higher probability of leading to a conclusion at all.

[Shivahn]

For the most part I agree.

We can determine the truth values of premises. The only premises we need to agree on are the base axioms of logic. From there, observation and logic lead us to convergent conclusions. That's the whole point of science, that it's convergent upon a single, correct point of view.

This is actually false though - if we only agree on the base axioms of logic then all we can prove are tautologies. Your "from there," isn't actually separate from that first point - it's essentially asserting that we are also taking our observations as premises. Which is pretty reasonable for the most part, since most people usually take their observations as premises. There are a few things that are wrong with that bit altogether though:

It for one thing, presumes that our observations are the same. They aren't, and thus there's no reason they should lead us to convergent opinions. They are in many cases, which is why most of us don't argue that the sky doesn't appear blue, but they aren't in other cases. And if you really want to get into the philosophy of science, the point of it isn't really to converge on what's definitely true, but on what models best predict phenomena. That seems to lead pretty well to what is true, but we run pretty fast into the problem of induction.

The real wrong thing of it, though, is the line "we can determine the truth of the premises." We can't do that using logic. Or to be more precise, we can but it's reliant upon the premises being true. If we use observation to determine the truth of the premises, we're not building up an airtight logical system, because we're assuming the observations are correct, and anyone who disagrees with the observations isn't going to care how valid the argument is. Nothing is ever going to prove the observations to be true within a logical framework, because doing so necessarily creates another set of premises we'd have to prove true, which would necessarily create another set...

It's turtles all the way down.

[Zamfir]

And what if people are dealing with premises that they don't know for sure. Some people follow the premises through a logical process and stick to the outcome. Others reject the outcome on emotional grounds (which might for example include the gut feeling of an experienced expert), and say that this outcome casts doubt on the premises. They try to improve on them but stuff is hard so they don't make much progress in clearly establishing a superior set of widely accepted premises . They still labour on.

That's a fairly typical situation. Who are you to say to that the emotional approach is wrong? Emotions are not produced by an evil demiurge, they are an intrinsic and highly developed part of the control mechanisms that have so far guided humans along reasonably well. Why refuse to listen them?

[sourmìlk]

Again, that "by definition" is not useful in determining truth. Jill may logically conclude that logic should be trusted while Bob feels that his emotions are trustworthy and Leslie has faith that faith is the best guide. Maybe Jimbo tosses some rocks on the ground, and reads in the rock's arrangement that they are a trustworthy guide to life. Reality is the standard of measure for truth, and logic is only useful insofar as it leads to that truth. A blind devotion to logic as its own standard is a sure way to throw reasonable error-checking out the window if you're convinced the conclusion you've reached is correct, just because you followed proper procedure to get there. It's a fantastic tool, but it is just a tool. In the OP's (and my girlfriend's) case, emotional appeal can be more a more functional tool of persuasion than detached reasoning; if it gets people closer to reality, more power to it.

I understand what you mean here, and it's getting sort of unnecessarily specific, but there's a little nitpick I'd like to make. I know that reality is the standard for truth, but reality is only determinable via the application of logic.

As logical analysis of true premises (and the verification of the truth of those premises) necessarily leads to the best possible conclusions, it is not ideal that humans respond more to emotional appeals, which do not necessarily lead to proper conclusions.

As the initial statement is infinitely recursive, going right for the emotional appeal has a higher probability of leading to a conclusion at all.

Now you're nitpicking too much.

As a logical analysis of true premises (and the verification of the truth of those premises until said premises are necessary axioms for logic to function) necessarily leads to the best possible conclusions, it is not ideal that humans respond more to emotional appeals which do not necessarily lead to proper conclusions.

Look, if this whole thread was about smaller nitpicks like this and not an expression of a fundamental problem you all had with the use of logic to determine truth, I would have ceded your points a while ago. All I'm trying to say is that there is a method employing logic and observation that necessarily determines truth (at least, as much as we can know truth), and that it's unfortunate humans prefer a method that doesn't necessarily determine truth to any reliable degree.

Shivahn: I recognize the necessary existence of certain axioms for logic and observation to function. It's totally beside my point.

Who are you to say to that the emotional approach is wrong?

The use of logic and observation rather than emotion demonstrably works. See: every scientific discovery ever.

Emotions are not produced by an evil demiurge, they are an intrinsic and highly developed part of the control mechanisms that have so far guided humans along reasonably well. Why refuse to listen them?

Because while emotions are useful for certain things, they are not useful for determining truth. Or at least, they are not the most useful tools available for determining truth.

[Meteoric]

We can determine the truth values of premises.

In a wide variety of situations, we cannot. To at least attempt to keep this on-topic, how would you determine the truth (or not) of the premises against gay marriage, not only to your satisfaction, but strongly enough that the people using those premises will feel compelled to reject them? Since, after all, that is the issue: it doesn't matter how confident you are that they're wrong, as long as they keep voting to the contrary.

[sourmìlk]

Well, a lot of the premises against gay marriage rely on the existence of a biblical god, which is demonstrably false as it contains contradictions and doesn't match up to evidence. Mind you, a lot of people aren't convinced even by solid logic (see: me), and that's rather what bothers me.

[yurell]

Well, a lot of the premises against gay marriage rely on the existence of a biblical god, which is demonstrably false as it contains contradictions and doesn't match up to evidence. Mind you, a lot of people aren't convinced even by solid logic (see: me), and that's rather what bothers me.

One can redefine 'God' to be non-interactive until after death, whereupon an unmeasurable 'soul' that possessed your consciousness (and was modifiable by your brain while alive) will either go to heaven or hell. This God instilled in the minds of his followers a set of rules, which were then included into previous mythologies. There is no test that you can perform to disprove this premise, it's constructed in such a way as to be unfalsifiable.

As for the definition other people are using for logic, Shivahn had that covered pretty well.

[sourmìlk]

Right, well if it's unfalsifiable then the logical thing to do is to assume the null hypothesis, which certainly isn't that there's a God who has a strict set of rules we must follow but can't be proven to exist.

[Angua]

Is the null hypothesis obviously that there isn't a god though? People need other people to make them, so the easiest hypothesis is that someone else made the first human.

[lutzj]

Well, a lot of the premises against gay marriage rely on the existence of a biblical god, which is demonstrably false as it contains contradictions and doesn't match up to evidence. Mind you, a lot of people aren't convinced even by solid logic (see: me), and that's rather what bothers me.

Here's a common anti-homosexual argument based on true premises and valid deduction:

P1: Sexual encounters between men are statistically much more likely to result in one partner contracting HIV than other sexual encounters. (factual observation)
P2: Married couples are statistically much more likely to engage in sexual encounters than random pairings of two people. (factual observation)
P3: Situations that increase the odds of contraction of HIV are bad for public health. (factual observation)
P4: The government should prohibit things that are bad for public health. (axiom)

1: Marriages between men are much more likely to result in one partner contracting HIV (P1,P2)
2: Marriages between men are bad for public health (P3, 1)
3: The government should prohibit marriages between men (P4, 2)
QED

Now find me a way to rebut this argument without contradicting the premises with your own premises.

[sourmìlk]

Is the null hypothesis obviously that there isn't a god though? People need other people to make them, so the easiest hypothesis is that someone else made the first human.

We know how evolution works, we have working hypotheses as to how abiogenesis may have happened, and even if we didn't, to say that it's God would be an argument from ignorance, not an assumption of a null hypothesis. Occam's Razor frowns upon the creation of unnecessary or unproven entities.

Here's a common anti-homosexual argument based on true premises and valid deduction:

P1: Sexual encounters between men are statistically much more likely to result in one partner contracting HIV than other sexual encounters. (factual observation)
P2: Married couples are statistically much more likely to engage in sexual encounters than random pairings of two people. (factual observation)
P3: Increasing the odds of contraction of HIV is bad for public health. (factual observation)
P4: The government should prohibit things that are bad for public health. (axiom)

1: Marriages between men are much more likely to result in one partner contracting HIV (P1,P2)
2: Marriages between men are bad for public health (P3, 1)
3: The government should prohibit marriages between men (P4, 2)
QED

Now find me a way to rebut this argument without contradicting the premises with your own premises.

Um, why can't I refute those premises and use my own? Nothing in my arguments said that we have to accept all premises as true, just the ones that are axiomatically necessary for logic to operate.

[lutzj]

Fine; which of those premises do you disagree with? The first three are factual and the fourth is a basic principle (one might say axiom) of public policy.

[Angua]

Well, we know how evolution works. The maths proving it is pretty complicated though. I wouldn't say that they're that certain on abiogenesis quite yet though.

I'm just pointing out that from some points of view, the idea that someone else did it is a lot simpler than everything creating itself. You aren't going to easily get someone to change premises.

[sourmìlk]

Angua, I didn't say people were particularly perceptive to logic. I've been saying the opposite, and why that's unfortunate. If people don't change their premises in the face of logic but do in the face of emotional appeals, that means that their change in premises won't necessarily be a good one.

Fine; which of those premises do you disagree with? The first three are factual and the fourth is a basic principle (one might say axiom) of public policy.

Well, I'd disagree that the person actually takes that fourth principle as axiomatic, and if he did I'd explain why he didn't need to. But even that's not necessary, as the person probably doesn't believe that the government should always interfere with public health. For example, he likely wouldn't agree that the government should place mandatory sodium limits on what a person can eat in a given day. So then we have to ascertain in what cases it is appropriate for government to interfere with public health, and that should only be when it doesn't interfere with other rights (perhaps with exceptions I haven't thought of quite yet), and that banning gay marriage denies gays the right to equal protection under the law.

There's also a logical fallacy, namely that, because unmarried gays have higher transmission rate of STDs, that will apply to married homosexuals. And there's also the problem that allowing homosexuals to marry will probably reduce the transmission rate of HIV in the homosexual demographic because people will likely have fewer partners.

[yurell]

Is the null hypothesis obviously that there isn't a god though? People need other people to make them, so the easiest hypothesis is that someone else made the first human.

Yeah, but the null hypothesis is a premise.

[sourmìlk]

I don't get you guys: if an incorrect idea could be logically defended, how would you know that idea was incorrect?

[TheGrammarBolshevik]

Fine; which of those premises do you disagree with? The first three are factual and the fourth is a basic principle (one might say axiom) of public policy.

"Public health" strikes me as too vague a notion to be regarded as part of a strictly factual observation. It would be like trying to claim that there are facts about "the will of the people" or "Dumbledore's sexuality." And the fourth premise is clearly not widely accepted, just by the observation that many, many things plausibly bad for "public health" a) are legal and b) would generate substantial resistance against attempts to ban them.

Edit: Well, maybe there's more room for fact in claims about public health. But at least you need to define what "public health" means.

[Shivahn]

I don't get you guys: if an incorrect idea could be logically defended, how would you know that idea was incorrect?

You should probably define "know," if you haven't already.

If you mean "know" in the inductive sense, then we "know" because we've induced that, given everything else we "know," some premises are false. We don't share "knowledge" though, which is part of the reason we come to different conclusions.

If you mean know in the 100% deductive sense, then you've made a mistake in your assumption that we could ever know an idea is incorrect.

Fine; which of those premises do you disagree with? The first three are factual and the fourth is a basic principle (one might say axiom) of public policy.

"Public health" strikes me as too vague a notion to be regarded as part of a strictly factual observation. It would be like trying to claim that there are facts about "the will of the people" or "Dumbledore's sexuality." And the fourth premise is clearly not widely accepted, just by the observation that many, many things plausibly bad for "public health" a) are legal and b) would generate substantial resistance against attempts to ban them.

Edit: Well, maybe there's more room for fact in claims about public health. But at least you need to define what "public health" means.

It also relies on "if A increases the incidence of B, and B increases the incidence of C, then increasing A increases C." Which isn't necessarily true. But it's not that bad and could probably be tweaked to be "proper".

[sourmìlk]

I don't get you guys: if an incorrect idea could be logically defended, how would you know that idea was incorrect?

You should probably define "know," if you haven't already.

If you mean "know" in the inductive sense, then we "know" because we've induced that, given everything else we "know," some premises are false. We don't share "knowledge" though, which is part of the reason we come to different conclusions.

If you mean know in the 100% deductive sense, then you've made a mistake in your assumption that we could ever know an idea is incorrect.

I don't mean in the complete deductive sense. And if we can know what's incorrect via the use of logic and inductive knowledge of the truth of premises, I don't see why I shouldn't prefer that to emotional appeals.

[TheGrammarBolshevik]

I don't get you guys: if an incorrect idea could be logically defended, how would you know that idea was incorrect?

If by "logically defended" you mean "defended by valid argument with true premises," then it wouldn't be an incorrect idea. But perhaps it would be better to move toward standard terminology than to insist that people who use and understand the terminology as it is standardly used and understood are wrong?

[sourmìlk]

What? I've never had a problem with your terminology, just your apparent assertions that there isn't any way to determine truth.

[TheGrammarBolshevik]

I don't recall defending that thesis. But at any rate I don't see why "False claims are incapable of logically sound defense" would be a counterclaim to that. If we can't determine truth, we can't determine the soundness of an argument, so logic is not going to pull us out of that hole.

In other words what Shivahn has said more than once: logic is truth-preserving, but not truth-generating.

[Greyarcher]

I don't get you guys: if an incorrect idea could be logically defended, how would you know that idea was incorrect?

If by "logically defended" you mean "defended by valid argument with true premises," then it wouldn't be an incorrect idea. But perhaps it would be better to move toward standard terminology than to insist that people who use and understand the terminology as it is standardly used and understood are wrong?

I'll second that.

We can logically defend a smackton of stuff. Now, defending stuff with logically sound arguments--in the ideal sense--well, that's a whole different story. Usually irrelevant too, I'd wager, since evaluating the soundness of premises gets into that whole "knowing how we know" business. Which is itself an unpleasant muddle of competing epistemic criteria and hypothetical fringe cases. Trying to build a proper foundation for knowledge is blippery.

[sourmìlk]

I don't recall defending that thesis. But at any rate I don't see why "False claims are incapable of logically sound defense" would be a counterclaim to that. If we can't determine truth, we can't determine the soundness of an argument, so logic is not going to pull us out of that hole.

In other words what Shivahn has said more than once: logic is truth-preserving, but not truth-generating.

I know, you need observation to generate truth, and I've said that several times. What exactly is this about if you're not saying that there isn't a means of determining the truth of things?

[TheGrammarBolshevik]

I was under the impression that it was about your objections to what people are saying here. I haven't said that there isn't a means of determining the truth of things, so if it's somehow about my saying that then it's quite by accident.

[sourmìlk]

What I'm objecting to is that people think there isn't a means by which we can consistently determine truth

[gmalivuk]

What I'm objecting to is that people think there isn't a means by which we can consistently determine truth

There isn't a means by which we can always determine truth.

Because some things are untestable or unprovable or simply not statements about things that are even capable of being true or false in the first place. And loads of other things are built up from those hings, especially ethical and religious things.

[TheGrammarBolshevik]

What do you mean by "consistently"? I think there are methods that, when we see the opportunity to use them, consistently yield correct results.* But there are many situations in which those methods do not apply; it may be said that our opportunities to use them are inconsistent.

[Greyarcher]

What I'm objecting to is that people think there isn't a means by which we can consistently determine truth

We have a variety of methods of arriving at conclusions and consensus in different fields. But truth? Even if we had a true statement, I'm not sure if we could know that we know it's a true statement; I suspect that would be like lifting ourselves by our bootstraps. Reason cannot ground itself, and all that.

We can test hypotheses and arguments in various ways. And oftentimes we can do so rigorously enough to arrive at very practically useful conclusions. We have it down to sciences. And that suffices.

If "truth" has merit, it's as an ideal. Rather than something one actually obtains, it's a measure. IMO.

[sourmìlk]

What I'm objecting to is that people think there isn't a means by which we can consistently determine truth

There isn't a means by which we can always determine truth.

Because some things are untestable or unprovable or simply not statements about things that are even capable of being true or false in the first place. And loads of other things are built up from those hings, especially ethical and religious things.

Unfalsifiable things or things without a truth value aren't relevant to whether or not a given method can determine truth.

What do you mean by "consistently"? I think there are methods that, when we see the opportunity to use them, consistently yield correct results.* But there are many situations in which those methods do not apply; it may be said that our opportunities to use them are inconsistent.

I am fine with a definition of "consistently" that doesn't apply to things for which the method is not meant to solve.

What I'm objecting to is that people think there isn't a means by which we can consistently determine truth

We have a variety of methods of arriving at conclusions and consensus in different fields. But truth? Even if we had a true statement, I'm not sure if we could know that we know it's a true statement; I suspect that would be like lifting ourselves by our bootstraps. Reason cannot ground itself, and all that.

We can test hypotheses and arguments in various ways. And oftentimes we can do so rigorously enough to arrive at very practically useful conclusions. We have it down to sciences. And that suffices.

Fine, we arrive as close to truth as is possible.

My entire point is that it's unfortunate that humans aren't perceptive to the use of that method because it consistently yields good results while appeals to emotion do not, and I still don't get what your objections to that are.

If "truth" has merit, it's as an ideal. Rather than something one actually obtains, it's a measure. IMO.

[gmalivuk]

it consistently yields good results while appeals to emotion do not

For certain, unfalsifiable axioms about what "good" means...

And our objections are to the fact that you still apparently can't seem to wrap your mind around how circular your definitions are for almost every technical term you're using, or the consequent fact that those of us who have actually studied logic can't pin down much of what you're claiming, because you insist on not using words correctly.

[elasto]

I'm going to summarise the main problems as I see them - even if we ignore the fact that objective truth is fundamentally unknowable.

(1) In the real world, people care less about truth and more about utility. This is no less the case in physics as it is in politics. The question isn't so much 'is it true?' as 'does it work?' And two people can answer that quite differently because of having different values. eg. 'Is a high level of welfare in a society a good thing?' is something rational and reasonable people can disagree on just because they hold different principles as sacred.

(2) In the real world, you can know the premises and the model almost perfectly and it can still be quite inaccurate due to chaos rearing its head. Chaos arises in politics and economics as much as it does in fluid dynamics.

(3) In the real world, it's essentially impossible to know enough about any given situation to know that you aren't wrong - whether you're talking about politics, ethics or anything else.

Just so long as one comes across as humble and open and willing to see things from other peoples' viewpoints one will do fine. It's only if one comes across with an air of arrogance - as if anyone with a different opinion merely hasn't thought it through sufficiently - that it gets peoples' backs up.

[sourmìlk]

it consistently yields good results while appeals to emotion do not

For certain, unfalsifiable axioms about what "good" means...

And our objections are to the fact that you still apparently can't seem to wrap your mind around how circular your definitions are for almost every technical term you're using, or the consequent fact that those of us who have actually studied logic can't pin down much of what you're claiming, because you insist on not using words correctly.

I'm trying to use words correctly. And I know my definitions are circular, which is why it's really confusing that you disagree with me. I'm saying things that are tautologically true and you're disagreeing.

[gmalivuk]

We're disagreeing with those definitions themselves.

I can define "true" to mean "fried fish" and "false" to mean "a yellow Volkswagen", and then "Every logical proposition is either fried fish or a yellow Volkswagen" is a trivially true statement (i.e. a tautology) based on my definitions.

But that in no way means they weren't bloody stupid definitions to start with.

[sourmìlk]

I don't see how my definition of "true" as "verified through valid logic and observation" is "bloody stupid". It's essentially the same as "What is consistent with reality (at least, as far as reality can actually be perceived)."

[Angua]

Because you have the 'valid logic and observation' in there. Then when we get you to define those things, you put in something along the lines of 'reasoning which gets us to the truth'. Both of those lead back to the other.