The Great Hippo wrote:But the tools of philosophy are logic, reason, rationality--these are tools that, when truly adopted and embraced, inevitably lead to science, materialism, and empiricism. How can you logically embrace Christianity? Hinduism, or Islam, or homeopathy, or the Bambino's Curse?
I agree with you here, but my point is that if someone didn't, in arguing about that we would be doing philosophy. In fact, in arguing about the value of philosophy we are doing philosophy right now: metaphilosophy is a branch of philosophy.
But I don't think philosophy is a useful tool to convince people who believe these things otherwise--because 'good' philosophy is using the very tools by which we arrived at science--and people who believe in the wonders of faith healing aren't even speaking that language. The only way you can convince people that faith healing is a crock of shit is by trying to understand their values, their beliefs, what's important to them--and then making a persuasive argument, not a logical one.
I'm not quite sure what you mean here by "persuasive" argument. All arguments aim at persuasion, and logic is one of (and I might argue the only correct) method of such persuasion.
Also, there is a whole continuum between people who intuitively grok the value of reason and apply it perfectly, and people who utterly and unabashedly reject it in its entirety. The opinions of the latter can be dismissed (though you still have to account for their behavior of course), and most people will agree that they should be. Most people will consider "unreasonable" a label they want to avoid having pinned on them, and will shun people who openly reject reason by name.
So if you can show them that they are being unreasonable, and how, they they will either be reasonable enough to accept your reasoning and become more reasonable (admittedly unlikely), or at least be ashamed of being unable to defend their claim to reasonability and thus be emotionally pressured to think about their position in an attempt to come up with such a defense, which is a good start and will slowly either adapt their position into a more reasonable one, at which point you've both won, or back them into the corner of outright rejecting reason to cling to their position, at which point they've lost.
I do this all the time. Someone comes into some discussion with some crazy-sounding position, and either I learn something and it doesn't sound so crazy anymore, they learn something and become less crazy, or they're exposed as complete loons and boo'd off stage, so to speak. Of course this last part depends on having a relatively sane 'audience' surrounding the debate, otherwise you just end up arguing alone with a complete loon to no point, or worse, getting jumped by all their friends; but then, everything in the world depends on there being a sufficient population of sane people to keep society functioning sanely.
Point being, someone can ostensibly care about being reasonable and yet still be unreasonable, to a great degree or just a slight degree; and showing them that fact can bring them around, since they ostensibly care about reason. Most debates happing within academic philosophy today are people arguing that each other are being slightly unreasonable in some way or another, and so may seem like fluff to people who just need to be reasonable enough to get on productively with something else. But in broader strokes, philosophy is of immense social utility in bringing the people who ostensibly care about being reasonable (most of them, at least I hope) closer to actually being reasonable, and in exposing those who really don't care about it at all for the crackpots that they are.
One of my goals as a moral creature is to figure out a definition of human prosperity that the majority of people can agree to. It's a bit silly, and probably not going to happen, but I don't think there are many people on earth who disagree with the basic premise--'humans should prosper' is such a neutral statement that it's hard to find issue with it. People who think only they should prosper are outing themselves as people who are unconcerned with morality (at least, morality as most of us would reasonably define it)--people who think only a select set of humans should prosper are similarly outing themselves as what we might reasonably describe as 'fuckdicks'.
Right, and trying to figure out what prosperity (or the good life, or "the Good", etc) is, is literally one of the oldest philosophical questions. Most people ostensibly care about being good, and think they have some idea of what is good. To argue about such matters, we usually show how some proposed standard of goodness has bad implications -- and since the people we're arguing with care about being good, that will be persuasive. In doing this, you are doing philosophy. The amoral fuckdicks, as you put it, get exposed in this process and excluded from the dialogue, just like the people who outright reject reason do in the dialogues described above.
This is essentially what's happening in the debate about Objectivist ethics in this thread. Each side is telling the other "Look, what you propose is tantamount in this that and the other case to being an amoral fuckdick; you're {stealing from people|letting people starve in the street|etc}. You don't want to be a fuckdick, right? You're aiming to be moral? Because you're failing at that and might want to reconsider your strategy." If either side says "No actually I don't really care to be moral", they've lost. And if they get backed into a corner and can't offer a defense, that forces them to rethink things, which is the trailhead to mutual victory.
The rethinking almost never happens real-time in the live conversation, while is why it probably seems unproductive to you. It takes a really big man to honestly evaluate new arguments and say "You're right, I was mistaken, I've changed my mind" right away, and even I'm usually not up to anything more than "I can't think of a response right now, so I'll just drop it". In that kind of case, the "loser" invariably skulks off sour about the whole thing thinking of some way he can rejigger his arguments to not lose next time, and either he comes up with a better argument for his already-correct position, he tweaks his position to be more defensible, or he continues to lose ongoing debates until he either does one of those things or throws a tantrum and gets disqualified from grown-up talk.
Again, I apologize for the bitterness (and I actually appreciate the opportunity to talk with a pro-philosophy type person about this)
No need to apologise, you didn't come off as especially bitter. Many reasonable people dismiss philosophy as unnecessary, so I've had this conversation many times (and I enjoy it too, otherwise I wouldn't partake in it).
but I don't see philosophy as having done a lot of the heavy lifting when it comes to making these premises so strong. It's the science--the actual experimentation, the gains made by that science--which makes materialism so strong. I trust materialism because planes let me fly, cars let me drive, computers let me type--and magical broomsticks, dragons, and wizards have yet to replace them. I trust skepticism because that which cannot be accurately measured, tested, and proven via experiment does not concern me--for me, they are meaningless things.
This trust stems from a mixture of experience and absorption of the information available to me; I wasn't convinced by a philosophical argument. I'm sure some people were, and I'm sure some of the things they said and did added to my experience, leading me to my conclusion--but I can't help but suspect that skepticism and empiricism would persist with or without philosophy. They are such simple, primal concepts, and philosophy seems like this extraordinarily complex, self-concerned field.
They are simple, primal concepts, and people have defended them in one form or another for as long as there has been philosophy, since long before there was science as we know it today. But, in the realm of natural philosophy, their proponents eventually won quite a decisive victory, refined the principles well and put them into practice in a program that was so phenomenally successful that that success by itself stands as such a great testament to the validity of the principles that people are convinced of them without even hearing the logical justification for them. People like you, who see what has become of that program -- natural science -- and see its foundations as patently obvious.
But natural science got its start from a bunch of philosophers doing what they called natural philosophy. You don't need to hear the epistemological and metaphysical arguments that underlaid those early scientists' positions to be convinced of their positions now, any more than you need to understand quantum mechanics to use your computer; your computer proves that quantum mechanics is right, whatever its details are that you don't need to worry about, because your computer depends on quantum mechanical principals to function. But your computer wouldn't exist if it weren't for physicists and engineers who understood quantum mechanics and put it to good use, and science wouldn't exist if it weren't for philosophers who understood epistemology and metaphysics and put them to good use.
That kind of revolutionary success hasn't happened yet in moral philosophy. We don't have a moral science yet. I think we can, and we need to; that we've slowly been approaching that threshold the past few centuries, but we still need to get that revolution off the ground, to build a foundation of moral principles so solid that people can just apply them to figuring out the details of what in particular is good or bad, right or wrong, without necessarily doing the philosophy that lead to those principles. I think we as a civilization are not really doing ethics proper at all, any more than Aristotle was doing physics proper by today's definition, because we don't have the foundational issues sorted out well enough yet. In short, I think we need to get ethics into good enough shape that it can be spun out from philosophy the same way that physics was, and then we will have the state that you want where we're doing practical moral reasoning, not philosophy. But to get to that point, we need to do some philosophy still.
And even once we're there, and we've got a moral science to compliment our natural science, it will still have its detractors just as natural science does, and there will still be a large body of the populace who misunderstands it and needs it explained to them better, and in engaging those groups we will still be doing philosophy of the kind detailed at the start of this post.